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THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN
ISLAMIC AND CONVENTIONAL BANKS
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to examine the association between internal corporate governance and
earnings management and to compare earnings management practices in Islamic banks versus
conventional banks in the MENA region.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses an unbalanced panel data of 20 Islamic banks and 100
conventional banks, from eleven countries in the MENA region over the period 2012-2017. Discretionary
accruals are used to measure earnings management by estimating loan loss provision. Regression
analysis is used to test the hypotheses.
Findings – The results indicate that Islamic banks provide fewer earnings management practices
compared to conventional banks. Besides, the results show that among the six corporate governance
mechanisms studied in this paper only board meetings, board size, and board independence can help
in mitigating earnings management for conventional banks. Whereas, for the case of Islamic banks,
corporate governance mechanisms have no impact on reducing earnings management.
Practical implications – This paper could offer some recommendations for policymakers, regulators, and
users of financial statements. The results of this study could assist in improving the monitoring role of
the board of directors and understanding the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and
earnings management.
Originality/value – This paper contributes by investigating the effect of new mechanisms on earnings
management, and by examining earnings management practices in Islamic banks compared to
conventional banks in unexamined countries and periods.
Keywords Earnings management, Earnings quality, Islamic banks, Conventional banks, Corporate
governance mechanisms, Annual reports, MENA region.
Paper type Research paper
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1. INTRODUCTION
Earnings management has been receiving increasing attention after the bankruptcy of
leading companies such as Enron and WorldCom. This bankruptcy is caused by manipulating
financial statements, result in the loss of billions of dollars because investors rely on
manipulated financial statements to make their decisions (Healy & Palepu, 2003). Therefore,
earnings management is considered one of the financial reporting problems. Earnings
management occurs when managers use the choices available to them within the boundaries of
GAAP to manage earnings for their benefit. Consequently, earnings management practices are
considered a threat to the reliability and credibility of financial reporting and have been stated
by Levitt (1998) as “the numbers game”.
A large amount of literature has addressed earnings management practices in the banking
sector. Some of this literature found that banks tend to manage their earnings to decrease
earnings volatility over the years (Shen & Chih, 2005). However, studies related to earnings
management in Islamic banks are very limited and present mixed results. Some studies contend
that the idea of earnings manipulation in Islamic banking appears to be inconsistent with the
moral and ethical values on which Islamic banks are based (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012; Quttainah et
al., 2013). On the other hand, other studies found that Islamic banks are similar to conventional
banks, are challenged with information asymmetry and conflicts of interest that can prompt
opportunistic practices that are conflicting to Islamic standards (Shamsuddin & Ismail, 2013).
Literature also provides mixed results about the factors that may restrain earnings management
in the banking industry. One of these factors is corporate governance mechanisms such as board
size, board independence, and role duality. However, other important mechanisms such as
foreign directors, female directors, and board meetings are not widely studied in the literature
(Rahman & Bremer, 2016).
In the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), limited research has been done in
the earnings management area in the banking industry (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2016). Therefore,
this study aims to address this gap by comparing the engagement level in earnings management
in Islamic banks and conventional banks and examining how corporate governance mechanisms
particularly foreign directors, female directors, board meetings, board size, board independence,
and role duality may influence earnings management in both Islamic and conventional banks for
a sample of banks in eleven MENA region countries over the period 2012-2017. This paper
attempts to answer the two following research questions:
RQ1: Do Islamic banks provide different earnings management practices compared to
conventional banks in the MENA region?
RQ2: What is the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management of
Islamic and conventional banks in the MENA region?
The paper organized as follows: After the introduction, the second section gives a theoretical
framework. Section three presents the literature review and hypotheses development. Section
four discusses the research design and methodology. Section five devoted to statistical analysis
and discussion of the findings. Section six provides the research conclusion, contribution,
recommendations, limitations, and suggestions for future research.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Earnings Management
Management can utilize their information about the business to enhance the us efulness of
financial reporting. Therefore, management practice judgment in financial reporting
(Xiong, 2006). Although that managements’ judgment has a positive side, it additionally
generates a possibility for management to manage financial statements in a manner that
usually benefits them. Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) state that “Earnings management
occur when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to
alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholder about the underlying economic
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported

accounting numbers.”. This is the most common explanation of earnings management
recognized in the relevant literature. However, Ronen and Yaari (2008) categorize earnings
management as white, gray, or black. Beneficial (white) earnings management improves
the transparency of financial reports; the pernicious (black) includes absolute
misrepresentation and fraud; whereas the gray is the manipulation of financial reports
within the boundaries of GAAP, which could be either opportunistic or efficiency enhancing (Ronen & Yaari, 2008). This research focuses on opportunistic earnings
management that aims to maximize the private benefits of managers. Earnings management
can be done by using different methods which are accrual earnings management, real
earnings management, and classification earnings management. This study focuses on
accrual earnings management which deals with using the manager’s discretion to change
estimations and accounting strategies including loan loss provisions. This study uses loan
loss provisions to measure earnings management since it is the major accrual in the banking
sector.

2.2 Loan Loss Provisioning in Banks
The major accrual in the banking sector is loan loss provisions (LLPs) (Ben Othman
& Mersni, 2014; Taktak et al., 2010). Loan loss provisions (LLPs) are a relatively major
accrual for banks and consequently have a significant impact on earnings and regulatory
capital of banks (Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008). The purpose of these provisions is to adjust
banks’ loan loss reserves to reflect expected future losses on their loan portfolios. Bouvatier
and Lepetit (2008) differentiate between non-discretionary and discretionary loan loss
provisioning. Non-discretionary loan loss provisioning is intended to cover the anticipated
losses of the loan in the loan portfolio of the bank due to changes in the bank’s business
condition. However, discretionary accruals, as defined by Ronen and Yaari (2008, p. 372),
are “accruals that arise from transactions made or accounting treatments chosen to manage
earnings”. Therefore, managers use discretionary loan loss provisions to achieve private
benefits. This study focuses on discretionary loan loss provisions since it provides managers
with greater discretion to manipulate earnings.

2.3 Characteristics of Islamic Banks
Islamic banking is primarily based on the sharia regulation, which originates from
the explanation of the Quran, Sunnah, and other secondary sources of Islamic rational (El Gamal, 2006). Therefore, Islamic banks have some specific characteristics in comparison
to conventional banks. Islamic banking, by adopting Islamic sharia, concentrates more on
moral and ethical norms in their operations instead of monetary value (Hamdi & Zarai,
2012). Islamic banks are required to finance activities that are sharia-compliant only (Ben
Othman & Mersni, 2014). The differentiating characteristic of Islamic banks is forbidden
of interest (riba) (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012). The profit-sharing principle is utilized as an
alternative to interest. Accordingly, Islamic banks progress toward becoming partners with
depositors and shareholders, and they have to share risk with them (Farouk et al., 2012).
The prohibiting of interest and the actuating of profit-loss sharing principle make the
Islamic banks adopt a unique investment approach that differs from conventional banks
(Hamdi & Zarai, 2012; Taktak et al., 2010). Based on profit-loss sharing principles, Islamic
banks have a diverse loan portfolio that contains Mudharaba, Musharaka, Murabahah, and
Qard al- Hassan (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014). In general, Islamic banks face the risk of
uncollected investments in murabaha, musharakah, or mudarabah (Hanif, 2011).
Consequently, alike to conventional banks, Islamic banks need to absorb the expected
possible future losses by creating an allowance for loan loss provisions (Quttainah et al.,
2013). Therefore, Islamic banks as same as conventional banks may also engage in earnings
management to meet the banking regulations.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
This section presents a critical review of the literature related to earnings management
practices in Islamic and conventional banks and the impact of corporate governance mechanisms
on EM practices. Based on this literature, a set of hypotheses to address the research questions
are constructed.

3.1 Earnings Management in Islamic Banks Vs. Conventional Banks
Notably, earnings manipulation in the banking sector is riskier than in other sectors.
This is because the banking sector has a critical function in supporting economic growth,
stability, and the welfare of society (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012; Quttainah et al., 2013).
Literature related to earnings manipulation in the Islamic banking sector is very limited and
provide mixed results (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014; Quttainah et al., 2013). There are two
different arguments regarding bank type and earnings management. The first argument,
considers Islamic banks like conventional banks engage in earning management. Under this
argument, the major goal of banks, regardless of Islamic banks or conventional banks, is to
attract deposits and to use those deposits to invest and to generate profits (Zoubi & Al‐
Khazali, 2007). Thus, Hamdi and Zarai (2012) find that Islamic banks have motivations to
manipulate earnings to prevent reporting losses and earnings diminutions to keep
confidence in Islamic banks. Also, Islamic banks, similar to conventional banks, may
practice earnings management to prevent violating the banking requirements such as
achieving a specific liquidity ratio and capital adequacy ratio (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014;
Shen & Chih, 2005). However, the second argument, consider that Islamic banks provide
different earnings management practices as compared to a conventional one. Islamic
banking is established based on the article of incorporation that states that business
operations and transactions of Islamic banks should comply with the Islamic Sharia. Islamic
Sharia involves the thought of protecting the interest of all stakeholders (Hasan, 2009).
Islamic ethical values maintain that the board of directors should disclose fair and reliable
information in their bank’s financial statement to allow stakeholders to take the appropriate
decision making and to avoid any injustice loss due to manipulating earnings. Therefore,
Sharia act as a vital part of forming the ethical practices of managers. In this regard,
Lassoued et al. (2018), Vania et al. (2018), and Quttainah et al. (2013) find found Islamic
banks are less possible to exercise earnings management than conventional banks. Besides,
Rahman et al. (2018) find that Muslim CEO and Muslim Chairman have a significant
negative relationship with earnings management. In the same manner, Zainuldin et al.
(2018) found that Islamic banks place higher considerations for ethical values in their
business activities than conventional banks. Consequently, agency problems and earnings
management in Islamic banks are likely to be less severe relative to their conventional
counterparts. Besides, Ashraf et al. (2015) found that Islamic banks show lower indications
of earning management than conventional banks since Islamic banks have sharia
supervisory boards that audit the behavior of the bank and ensure the conformity of Islamic
ethics. According to those arguments, earnings management from the Islamic banking
perspective is immoral behavior and prohibited in Islam. Therefore, the following
hypothesis is formulated:
H1: There is a significant difference in earnings management practices between Islamic
and conventional banks.

3.2 Earnings Management and Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Agency theory argues that corporate governance is an effective mechanism for
mitigating management opportunistic behavior (Miller et al., 2008). This research
focuses on some mechanisms of corporate governance that may reduce earnings
manipulation in Islamic and conventional banks discussed as follows:

3.2.1 Foreign members of the board of directors
Appointing a foreign director on the board may influence the board’s capability
to improve financial statements quality (Adams et al., 2010). There are two
contending points of view to clarify the expected impact of foreign directors on
earnings manipulation. On one hand, foreign directors may enhance the effectiveness
of the board and, accordingly aid to diminish earnings management (Ruigrok et al.,
2007). The presence of foreign directors may assist in avoiding the very high range
of cohesiveness of directors on the board by showing independent reasoning
(Hooghiemstra et al., 2016). This will improve discussions and possibly lead to
effective monitoring (Srinidhi et al., 2011). Adams et al. (2010) contend that the
presence of foreign members on the board could improve and expand advisory
abilities, monitoring skills, and observing the duty of the boards, by bringing the
knowledge and awareness of the foreign market and as a result, decreasing earnings
management. On the other hand, foreign directors may be less effective in their
monitoring process for two reasons. First, foreign directors are probably less familiar
with local regulations, governance standards, and manager’s techniques, making it
more problematic for them to assess management choices and behaviors (Masulis et
al., 2012). Second, language barriers may weaken the capability of the foreign
directors to effectively contribute to debates in the board’s meeting room (Piekkari
et al., 2015; Tenzer et al., 2014). These reasons may result in more agency issues
between shareholders and managers that lead to more earnings management practices.
Based on the previous discussion, the existence of foreign directors on the board
contributes to more critical monitoring of the manager, and therefore, lower levels of
earnings management. Consequently, the succeeding hypotheses are made:
H2a: There is a significant negative association between the number of foreign
directors and the level of earnings management in Islamic banks.
H2b: There is a significant negative association between the number of foreign
directors and the level of earnings management in conventional banks.
3.2.2 Gender diversity
During the past three decades, growing attention has been given to gender
diversity 1 in top positions, especially the board of directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009).
Examining the impact of board gender diversity on earnings management is limited,
and the findings are mixed. One stream of literature indicates a negative relationship
between female directors and earnings management. Based on a theoretical
behavioral perspective, earlier studies show that women directors are more sensitive
to moral and ethical matters in decision making (Gull et al., 2018), less tolerance to
engage in opportunistic practices, call for a higher earnings quality from men
managers, and assign less significance on self-interest (Krishnan & Parsons, 2008).
Prior studies suggest that female directors have higher board meetings attendance
than male directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), this assists in more accountability for
management choices (Damak, 2018). Besides, Selahudin et al. (2018) and Nielsen
and Huse (2010) found that females tend to deliver better control for financial
reporting irregularities. Also, from an agency theoretical perspective, gender
diversity decreases agency problems, mainly conflict of interest among shareholders
and managers (Terjesen et al., 2009). More notably, Srinidhi et al. (2011) show that
women executives enhance the environment of information through more
concentrated oversight, which decreases information asymmetry. On the
contrary, Osemene et al. (2018), Elghuweel et al. (2017), and Sun et al. (2011) fail to
recognize a relationship among women directors on the board and the level of accrualbased earnings management. Based on agency and behavioral theoretical theories,
female executives are considered as a good corporate governance mechanism that
prompts more earnings management reduction. The previous discussion ends in the
below hypotheses:

H3a: There is a significant negative association between a female director and
earnings management in Islamic banks.
H3b: There is a significant negative association between a female director and
earnings management in conventional banks.
3.2.3 Board meeting frequency
Consistent with agency theory, corporate governance is important to align the
interests of managers and shareholders by providing powerful monitoring st rategies
and enhancing the reliability of financial information (Vafeas, 1999). One important
perspective of corporate governance that not sufficiently explored is board
effectiveness and commitment. The number of board meetings is a signal of board
effectiveness and commitment (Xie et al., 2003). The lack of time to finish
obligations and duties can be a critical weakness to the effectiveness of the board (AlMusali & Ku Ismail, 2015). Board meetings are the crucial mechanism for boards of
directors to meet their corporate governance commitments, especially to control
manager’s opportunistic behavior, and to ensure transparent and high-quality
financial reporting and consequently reducing earnings management practices (Kent
& Stewart, 2008). In this regard, some studies contend that the board can practice its
supervisory role more effectively when they meet regularly (Adams & Mehran,
2003). Moreover, Chouaibi et al. (2018) found a negative relationship between
earnings management and board meetings. Besides, Xie et al. (2003) claim that
earnings management issues are not considered in a board with infrequent meetings.
In contrast, Jensen (2010) and Vafeas (1999) show that board meetings have no
impact on board effectiveness. They propose that routine duties and responsibilities
absorb a significant part of the meetings, limiting chances for directors to practice
meaningful control over the managers’ team. Nevertheless, to the best of the
researchers’ knowledge, few studies have investigated the effect of board meeting
frequency on earnings management (Chouaibi et al., 2018). This study suggests that
boards that meet regularly ought to offer more time in monitoring and ensuring the
reliability of financial reporting, and subsequently, more probably to restrain earnings
management. According to these arguments, the following hypotheses are
formulated:
H4a: There is a significant negative association between board meeting frequency
and earnings management in Islamic banks.
H4b: There is a significant negative association between board meeting frequency
and earnings management in conventional banks.
3.2.4 Board of directors’ size
The board of directors is a crucial mechanism of corporate governance
(Christensen et al., 2010). Accounting research highlights board size as a mechanism
to reduce agency problems and assess the board’s effectiveness in reducing earnings
management practices (Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007; Larcker et al., 2007). There are two
points of view regarding board size and earnings management. The first point of view,
suggests a negative association between large board size and earnings management
(Alareeni, 2018; Alves, 2012). Large board size is an effective mechanism in
controlling and monitoring the opportunistic behaviors of managers (Epps & Ismail,
2009). Klein (2002) suggests that organizations with larger boards are more likely to
have the capability to detect financial reporting irregularities. In a similar regard,
Farag and Mallin (2019), Peasnell et al. (2005), and Berghe and Levrau (2004)
provide evidence that a large board of directors is connected with better knowledge
and skills that reinforcing its ability to supervise and control managers’ behaviors. In
contrast, the second point of view, suggests a negative association between small
board size and earnings management (Jensen, 2010).

Small board size is more effective than large board size and consequently, they can
decrease the opportunistic practices of managers (Andres et al., 2005). Orozco et al.
(2018) argue that small board size is more effective in monitoring and controlling
managers' opportunistic behavior. Besides, González and García-Meca (2014)
demonstrated that when the number of directors is large, members of the board are
less probable to be held accountable, thus they tend in the direction of more discretion
in getting higher compensation (Beasley, 1996), and are more inclined to information
asymmetry (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). However, other investigations do not
find any evidence that board size has any significant relationship with the extent of
earnings management (Osemene et al., 2018; Elghuweel et al., 2017). Based on the
above discussions, it is expected that board size is an essential component in board
characteristics that could have an impact on earnings manipulation behaviors.
Though, given the mixed findings in the literature, the direction of the association
between board size and earnings management cannot be determined. Consequently,
the following hypotheses are formulated:
H5a: There is a significant association between board size and earnings
management in Islamic banks.
H5b: There is a significant association between board size and earnings
management in conventional banks.
3.2.5 Board of directors’ independence
The main role of the board of directors is to monitor the management team
(Nicholson & Newton, 2010). For more effective monitoring, the board of directors
should comprise independent directors who are expected to behave independently in
their supervision and monitoring process (Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2011; Moscariello et
al., 2019). Independent directors are board members who have no material
relationship with the organization (He & Sommer, 2010). Prior literature has provided
mixed findings concerning board composition. Some research, based on agency
theory, supports a negative relationship between independent directors and earnings
management (Chouaibi et al., 2018; Kolsi & Grassa, 2017; Peasnell et al., 2005). This
stream of literature argues that the perfect solution to improve internal control within
the organization is to have independent directors on the board. Also, the independent
directors have an effective role in reducing conflict of interest between managers and
shareholders as well as improving the transparency and compliance of financial
reports (Christensen et al., 2010). Therefore, a board with a majority of independent
directors will better oversee the managers and decrease the probability of managing
earnings (Uzun et al., 2004). However, some studies do not recognize any association
between independent directors and earnings management (Abdul Rahman & Haneem
Mohamed Ali, 2006; Saleh et al., 2007). Conversely, other studies found a positive
relationship between independent directors and earnings management (Alareeni,
2018; Osma & Noguer, 2007). Liu (2012) and Taktak and Mbarki (2014) found that
boards that consist of dependent directors are observed to be an effective control
mechanism. Dependent directors have access to information that assists them to be
more effective in assessing managers’ choices and to mitigate earnings management
(Liu et al., 2015). After the above discussions, this paper expects that board
independence is associated with a lower incidence of earnings management.
Consequently, the hypotheses are as follows:
H6a: There is a significant negative association between board independence and
earnings management in Islamic banks.
H6b: There is a significant negative association between board independence and
earnings management in conventional banks.

3.2.6 Role duality
When CEO duality occurs, there is an absence of separation between decision
management and decision control (Krause et al., 2014). There are two streams of
literature that studied the relationship between role duality and earnings management.
One stream of literature supports a positive association between CEO duality and
earnings manipulation (Ge & Kim, 2014; Nuanpradit, 2019). This stream is based on
agency theory that contends that the chairman and the CEO should have two separate
roles. This separation is to ensure that the CEO would not be in a position with
excessive power over board matters to easily manipulate earnings (Klein, 2002).
Besides, the board of directors will have less motivation to oversee the activities of
the firm’s managers when combined leadership exists, since the leader of managers
is also the leader of the board of directors. This may increase information asymmetry
and consequently more earnings management practices (Wang et al., 2014). In
contrast, the second stream of literature supports a negative association between CEO
duality and earnings manipulations (Faleye, 2007; Weir et al., 2002). Proponents of
the stewardship theory, argue that this role duality enhances the functioning of the
board (Tuggle et al., 2010). Jouber and Fakhfakh (2011) find that a CEO can control
the information to other board members effectively in a dual leadership structure.
Moreover, Dalton (2012) and Dahya et al. (2009) argue that duality is crucial to
achieving centralization of authority, unity of command to reduce any potential
conflict between CEO and chairperson. On the other hand, some researcher does not
recognize any association between CEO duality and earnings management (Alareeni,
2018; Chouaibi et al., 2018; Bradbury et al., 2006). Based on the above arguments,
this research assumes that the dual structure may increase earnings manipulation.
Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H7a: There is a significant positive association between role duality and earnings
management in Islamic banks.
H7b: There is a significant positive association between role duality and earnings
management in conventional banks.

4. RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1 Population and Sample
The population of the current study consists of 309 banks operated in eleven countries
of the MENA region. One hundred eighty-nine banks are excluded because of data
unavailability. Therefore, the sample of this research consists of 20 Islamic banks and 100
conventional banks in eleven MENA region countries which are Lebanon, Bahrain, Egypt,
Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and
Tunisia for six consecutive years 2012-2017. These MENA countries were chosen because
the banking sector of these countries is well developed, efficient, and profitable (Ben
Othman & Mersni, 2016; Quttainah et al., 2013).

4.2 Measurement of Earnings Management
To detect earnings management of Islamic and conventional banks in the MENA
region, this study focuses on the accrual-based earnings management approach. More
specifically, this research uses a major accrual in the banking sector; loan loss provisions
(LLPs) (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014; Taktak et al., 2010). This study follows the approach
of Ben Othman and Mersni (2014), therefore, the basic model takes the following form:
Loan loss provisions = Non-discretionary LLP + Discretionary LLP
Non-Discretionary LLP is predicted by using variables demonstrating the level of
losses in the loan portfolio since it cannot be directly observed. Similar to Ben Othman and
Mersni (2014), the non-discretionary LLP component is expected using the beginning
balance of non-performing loans, change in non-performing loans, and change in total

loans. Discretionary LLP is estimated by the residual obtained from equation (1). This study
uses the discretionary component LLP as the dependent variable, which reflects earnings
management. Therefore, equation (1) is presented below:
LLPit = β0 + β1 NPLit-1+ β2 ΔNPLit + β3 ΔTLit+εit

(Eq. 1)

where:
LLPit: Total LLP for bank i at the year t, deflated by loans at the beginning of the year.
NPLit-1: The beginning balance of the non-performing loan for bank i at the year t deflated by
beginning loans.
ΔNPLit: Change in the value of the non-performing loan for bank i at the year t, deflated by
beginning loans.
ΔTLit: Change in the value of the total loan, for bank i at the year t, deflated by beginning loans.
β0: Regression constant.
β1, β2, and β3: Regression coefficients.
εit: Residuals.

4.3 Regression model
This study employs regression analysis to examine the relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms and earnings management. Besides, this study used the absolute
value when measuring earnings management because the focus of this research was on the
analysis of earnings management practices, regardless of whether earnings management
practices were income-increasing or income-decreasing (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014).
Also, the below equation contains independent variables that show factors hypothesized to
impact earnings management (EM) and control variables that must be held constant. The
independent variables were chosen based on the criteria that these variables are available
in the annual reports, and not widely studied before in the MENA region. Therefore,
equation (2) is presented below:
|EMit|= β0 + β1 BANK TYPEit + β2 FOREIGN DIRECTORit + β3 FEMALE DIRECTORit + β4
BOARD MEETINGit + β5 BOARD SIZEit + β6 BOARD INDEPENDENCEit + β7 ROLE
DUALITYit + β8 PROFITABILITYit + β9 BANK SIZEit + β10 COUNTRYit + β11 YEARit + εit
(Eq. 2)
where:
Dependent variable:
|EMit|: Discretionary loss provisions for loans for bank i in year t.
Independent variables:
BANK TYPE: Dummy variable that takes 1 if the bank is a conventional bank, 0 if the bank is
an Islamic bank (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014).
FOREIGN DIRECTOR: The number of a foreign director on the board for bank i in year t (Chiu
et al., 2010).
FEMALE DIRECTOR: The number of female directors on the board for bank i in year t (Nielsen
& Huse, 2010).
BOARD MEETING: Board meeting is measured by a number of the board meeting held during
the year (Eluyela et al., 2018).
BOARD SIZE: Board size for bank i at the year t, expressed as a number of board directors (Ben
Othman & Mersni, 2016).

BOARD INDEPENDENCE: The number of independent directors on the board for bank i in
year t (Kolsi & Grassa, 2017).
ROLE DUALITY: Dummy variable that takes 1 if the bank has role duality, 0 otherwise
(Bradbury et al., 2006).
Control variables:
PROFITABILITY: Measured by ROA as the net income divided by total assets (Elghuweel et
al., 2017).
BANK SIZE: Measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (Taktak et al., 2010).
COUNTRY: A set of country dummies used to control specific differences across countries (Ben
Othman & Mersni, 2016).
YEAR: A set of dummies used to control for time-specific factors (Quttainah et al., 2013).

5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table (1) present descriptive statistics for the dependent variable used in this study.
On average, in Islamic banks during the period 2012 to 2017, EM is 0.0057, and SD is
0.00650 with a range of 0.04 as a maximum and 0.00 as a minimum. While the descriptive
statistics for conventional banks indicate that the average and SD of EM respectively were
found to be 0.0137 and 0.01386 with a range of 0.09 as a maximum and 0.00 as a minimum.
Overall, the average and SD of EM for the full data set was found to be 0.0123 and 0.01326
with a range of 0.09 as a maximum and 0.00 as a minimum. Consequently, it is worth
mentioning that the results of the descriptive statistics of EM are not consistent between
different types of the bank; that is the average EM for a conventional bank was higher than
the average EM for Islamic banks; this indicates that all the sampled conventional banks in
the selected MENA countries engaged more in earnings management than Islamic banks.
There are six independent variables related to corporate governance mechanisms in
this study that are foreign director, female director, board meeting, the board size,
independent director, and role duality. From table (1), the mean level of foreign director on
the board in Islamic banks is about 0.0588, SD 0.23629, the minimum is zero, and the
maximum is 1 board member. However, the mean level of foreign directors on the board in
conventional banks is around 0.6830, SD 1.25229, the minimum is zero, and the maximum
is 7 board members. This means that conventional banks encourage the appointment of
foreign directors more than Islamic banks. Regarding the presentation of females on the
board, the descriptive indicates that the average and SD of females members in Islamic
banks respectively were found to be 0.2185 and 0.43491 with a range of 2 as a maximum
and zero as a minimum, while in conventional banks, the average and SD of females
member was found to be 0.5666 and 0.76629 with a range of 3 as a maximum and zero as
a minimum. This means that conventional banks and Islamic banks have a small number of
female directors on the board. On average, in Islamic banks during the period 2012 to 2017,
board meetings are 7.3866 and SD is 3.36258 with a range of 18 as a maximum and 3 as a
minimum meeting. While the descriptive statistics for conventional banks indicate that the
average and SD of board meetings respectively were found to be 6.1180 and 2.64758 with
a range of 28 as a maximum and zero as a minimum meeting. This means that conventional
banks and Islamic banks meet regularly.
Besides, the average board of director’s size in Islamic banks is 9.9580 board
members, SD 1.81983, with a minimum of 7 and a maximum of 14 board members, while
the average board of director’s size in conventional banks is 9.9595 board members, SD
2.04718, with a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 16 board members. This means that both
conventional banks and Islamic have a similar policy regarding the number of directors on
the board.

The mean level of board independence in Islamic banks is around 3.5546, SD 2.77610, the
minimum is zero, and the maximum is 10 board members. On the other hand, the mean
level of board independence in conventional banks is around 3.0860, SD 2.55236, the
minimum is zero, and the maximum is 11 board members. This means that both
conventional banks and Islamic have a similar policy regarding the number of independent
directors on the board. Concerning leadership structure, in Islamic banks , there is a
separation of the role of CEO and the chairman, the average and SD of role duality is zero,
while in conventional banks the average role duality is .2799, SD 0.44934, with a minimum
of zero in case of separation and a maximum of 1 in case the CEO is also the chairman of
the board. This means that only conventional banks accept a dual role on the board.
This study includes four control variables, which are profitability, bank size,
countries include 11 different countries and years various between 6 consecutive years.
However, the descriptive statistics in the table (1) indicate only two control variables:
Profitability is measured by return on assets (ROA), in Islamic banks, it ranges from -0.05
to 0.11, with a mean of 0.0108 and SD 0.01586, while in conventional banks it ranges from
-0.07 to 8.89, with a mean of 0.0302 and SD 0.36655. This means that on average
conventional banks in the MENA region are more profitable than Islamic banks. In addition
to bank size which is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets, in Islamic
banks, it ranges from USD 82,5 million to USD 91,500 million with a mean of USD 17,065
million and SD USD 20,515 million. However, bank size in conventional banks ranges from
USD 0.9052 million to USD 223,000 million, with a mean of USD 18,175 million and SD
USD 27,210 million. This means that on average conventional banks and Islamic banks in
the MENA region have a relatively same bank size. Other control variables such as
countries and years were eliminated from the descriptive statistics analysis since they are
measured by dummy variables.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for all the Variables Included in the Regression Model
Islamic banks

Conventional Banks

Variables
Min.

Max.

Mean

SD

Min.

Max.

Mean

SD

Earnings management

0

0.04

0.006

0.0065

0

0.09

0.014

0.0139

Foreign director

0

1

0.059

0.2363

0

7

0.683

1.2523

Female director

0

2

0.219

0.4349

0

3

0.567

0.7663

Board meeting

3

18

7.387

3.3626

0

28

6.118

2.6476

Board size

7

14

9.958

1.8198

6

16

9.96

2.0472

Board independence

0

10

3.555

2.7761

0

11

3.086

2.5524

Role duality

0

0

0

0

0

1

0.28

0.4493

Profitability

-0.1

0.11

0.011

0.0159

-0.07

8.87

0.0302

0.3666

Bank size in USD million

82,5

91,500

17,065

20,515

0.905

223,000

18,175

27,210

5.2 Panel Regression Analysis
After checking the regression assumptions, the table (2) represents the findings of the
regression model tested over the sampled MENA region banks.

Table 2: Regression Model Coefficients
Islamic banks
Model

Unstandardized
Coefficients

Conventional Banks
Sig.

B

Unstandardized
Coefficients

Sig.

Both bank type
Unstandardized
Coefficients

B

Sig.

B

(Constant)

-0.002

0.683

0.022

0.000***

0.016

0.000***

Bank type

-

-

-

-

0.004

0.004***

-0.003

0.276

0.000

0.445

0.000

0.276

0.002

0.285

0.000

0.546

0.001

0.299

0.000

0.381

-0.001

0.026**

0.000

0.041**

Board size
Board
Independence
Role Duality

0.001

0.260

0.001

0.097*

0.001

0.072*

0.000

0.619

-0.001

0.011**

-0.001

0.017**

-

-

0.001

0.708

0.003

0.282

Profitability

-0.077

0.092*

0.000

0.771

0.000

0.768

Bank size
Country
Bahrain
Country
Egypt
Country
Jordan
Country
Kuwait
Country
Lebanon
Country
Oman
Country Qatar
Country
Saudi Arabia

8.69275E-15

0.783

-5.92852E-14

0.007***

-5.429E-14

0.007***

0.006

0.005***

-0.005

0.145

-0.004

0.153

0.006

0.121

-0.007

0.010**

-0.007

0.004***

-0.003

0.260

-0.010

0.000***

-0.011

0.000***

-

-

-0.007

0.063*

-0.007

0.017**

-0.005

0.213

-0.006

0.095*

-0.007

0.016**

0.001

0.852

-0.007

0.054*

-0.007

0.033**

-0.002

0.286

-0.013

0.000***

-0.013

0.000***

-0.002

0.504

-0.015

0.000***

-0.013

0.000***

Country UAE

0.007

0.007***

-0.003

0.223

-0.003

0.223

Year 2013

-0.001

0.436

0.001

0.562

0.001

0.689

Year 2014

-0.002

0.378

-0.001

0.582

-0.001

0.472

Year 2015

-0.002

0.242

-0.001

0.670

-0.001

0.497

Year 2016

-0.001

0.622

-0.001

0.591

-0.001

0.490

Year 2017

0.001

0.623

0.000

0.816

0.001

0.621

Foreign
director
Female
director
Board
meeting

Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and * respectively.

The results report a significant positive association between bank type (being Islamic
or conventional bank) and earnings management (p < 0.01) (Table 2). This means that
conventional banks engage in more earnings management practices compared to Islamic
banks; hence, H1 is supported. These results confirm the argument of agency theory that
Islamic sharia plays an effective role in restricting the manager’s opportunistic behavior
(Zainuldin et al., 2018). This result is consistent with that of Lassoued et al. (2018), Vania
et al. (2018), and Quttainah et al. (2013). However, the result is inconsistent with that of
Ben Othman and Mersni (2014), Hamdi and Zarai (2012), and Shen and Chih (2005).

Moreover, to test that Islamic banks differ from conventional banks in earnings
management practices, an independent-samples T-test was applied using the absolute value
of residual as an indicator of earnings manipulation (Islamic versus conventional). The t
value is 9.718 resulted in a Sig. value of 0.000 (p < 0.05). Thus, the results indicate that
Islamic banks and conventional banks differed significantly on EM practices. By examining
the group means for this sample of subjects (Table 1), the results indicate that conventional
banks (with a mean of 0.0137) have significantly higher EM practices than Islamic banks
(with a mean of 0.0057).
Also, the results indicate a non-significant association between foreign directors and
earnings management in both Islamic and conventional banks (p > 0.10) (Table 2). This
means that the attendance of a foreign director on the board has no impact in reducing the
level of earnings management; hence, H2a and H2b are not supported. These results may
be justified for two reasons. First, foreign directors are probably less familiar with local
regulations, which weaken their ability to assess management behaviors and diminish
earnings manipulation. The second problem is the language where local directors do not
feel comfortable using the English language, and this is possibly going to impose heavier
loads on foreign directors than on national directors, therefore, weaken the foreign directors
monitoring ability to deduct earnings management. These results are consistent with that of
Piekkari et al. (2015) and Masulis et al. (2012) while contradicting that of Ruigrok et al.
(2007).
Moreover, the results indicate a non-significant association between female directors
and earnings management in both Islamic and conventional banks (p > 0.10) (Table 2). This
means that the participation of a female director on the board has no impact in reducing the
level of earnings management; hence, H3a and H3b are not supported. This results may
violate the concept of agency theory in which the presence of women on boards enhances
board independence, improve the effectiveness of the board, and improve the transparency
and accuracy of financial reports which result in reducing earnings management. These
results may be justified for two reasons. First, the presence of female directors on the board
is relatively small compared to men, this may cause a bias in the results due t o the
domination of men directors. Second, the appointment criteria of female directors in some
of the sampled MENA region banks are based on the continuity of the family member and
not on education and qualifications. This may reduce the effectiveness of women's role in
restricting earnings management. The appointment of qualified women directors based on
their academic qualifications, certifications, and experiences tend to deliver better control
for manipulated financial reports and encourage corporate ethical values. These results are
consistent with that of Osemene et al. (2018) and Elghuweel et al. (2017). However, this
result is inconsistent with that of Selahudin et al. (2018) and Nielsen and Huse (2010).
Furthermore, the results indicate a non-significant association between board meeting
frequency and earnings management in Islamic banks (p > 0.10) (Table 2). This means that
board meetings of the board have no impact on reducing the level of earnings management
in the case of Islamic banking; therefore, H4a is not supported. Besides, the results indicate
a significant negative association between board meeting frequency and earnings
management in conventional banks (p < 0.05) (Table 2). This means that board meetings
are a crucial mechanism for reducing the level of earnings management in conventional
banking; hence, H4b is supported. These results are consistent with agency theory which
argues that a number of board meetings are a signal of board effectiveness and commitment
and gives powerful monitoring to align managers’ interest with those of shareholders and
to enhance the reliability of financial information. These results are in line with that of
Chouaibi et al. (2018) and Xie et al. (2003). However, the results are contradicting with
that of Jensen (2010) and Vafeas (1999).
Besides, the results indicate a non-significant association between the board of
director’s size and earnings management in Islamic banks (p > 0.10) (Table 2). This means
that the board of director’s size does not influence the level of earnings management in the
case of Islamic banking and though H5a is not supported. Besides, the results indicate a

significant positive association between the board of director’s size and earnings
management in conventional banks (p < 0.10) (Table 2).
This means that banks with larger boards are more likely to have the capability to detect
financial reporting irregularities, and therefore H5b is supported. These results confirm the
concept of agency theory that highlights the board size as a mechanism to re duce agency
problems and can be used to assess the board's effectiveness in ensuring the quality of
financial reporting. These results are consistent with that of Farag and Mallin (2019) and
Alareeni (2018) while contradicting that of Orozco et al. (2018) and Osemene et al. (2018).
Further, the results indicate a non-significant association between the board of
director’s independence and earnings management in Islamic banks (p > 0.10) (Table 2).
This means that the board of director’s independence does not influence the level of
earnings management in the case of Islamic banking and though H6a is not supported.
Besides, the results indicate a significant negative association between the board of
director’s size and earnings management in conventional banks (p < 0.05) (Table 2). This
means that independent directors are more effective in monitoring tasks than dependent
directors, which results in reducing the level of earnings management, and hence, H6b is
supported. These results are consistent with agency theory, which supports the concept that
the perfect solution to improve internal control within the organization is to have an
independent board. These results are consistent with that of Chouaibi et al. (2018) and Kolsi
and Grassa (2017). However, the results are inconsistent with that of Alareeni (2018) and
Saleh et al. (2007).
Regarding role duality, in the case of the selected Islamic banks in this research, there
is no role duality detected. Therefore, the regression analysis fails to show any result related
to role duality and Islamic banks (Table 2); hence, H7a is not supported. Also, the results
indicate a non-significant association between role duality and earnings management in
conventional banks (p > 0.10) (Table 2). This means that role duality has no impact on the
level of earnings management in the case of conventional banking, and though H7b is not
supported. These results are consistent with that of Alareeni (2018) and Chouaibi et al.
(2018) while contradicting that of Nuanpradit (2019) and Faleye (2007).

6. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this research was to provide a comparison between Islamic banks and
conventional banks in their practices of managing earnings and to investigate earnings
management and its corporate governance determinations for a sample of conventional and
Islamic banks in eleven MENA region countries including Lebanon, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Tunisia over the
period 2012-2017.
The results of this research demonstrated that Islamic banks provide fewer earnings
management practices than conventional banks in the MENA region due to Islamic ethical
framework and Islamic Sharia which is an effective monitoring tool in mitigating opportunistic
behavior in managing results, thereby enhancing the quality of reported earnings. Moreover, the
results show that among the six corporate governance mechanisms studied in this research, only
board meetings, the board size, and board independence can help in mitigating earnings
management for conventional banks in the MENA region. Whereas, for the case of Islamic
banks, corporate governance mechanisms have no impact in reducing earnings management for
two reasons. First, earnings management is very low in Islamic banks, and the second reason is
due to the domination of sharia law and sharia supervisory board in eliminating any unethical
behavior such as earnings management. However, even though the research findings answer the
two research questions, earnings management needs to be more investigated in the MENA
region.
This research may contribute to the existing literature by investigating the effect of three
mechanisms which are the presence of female directors on the board, foreign members on the
board, and the board of directors meeting frequency on earnings management in both Islamic

and conventional banks in the MENA region. Besides, this research is one of the few studies to
examine earnings management practices in Islamic banks compared to conventional banks in
Lebanon, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates during the period
range from 2012 to 2017 (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2016; Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014).
Moreover, this study could be beneficial for regulators, shareholders, and users of
financial statements. Regulators and shareholders could use the results of this paper to reinforce
their monitoring strategy of the board of directors and restrict the discretionary practices of
management. Based on the research findings, this paper provides some recommendations. First,
regulators should force conventional banks with ethical standards that they should follow to
limit the practice of earnings management. Second, the board of directors should encourage the
appointment of local directors because they are more aware of local language and policies so
they can better assess the manager’s decisions. Third, the board of directors should encourage
the appointment of qualified women directors based on their academic qualifications,
certifications, and experiences. Fourth, the board of directors should attempt to make frequent
meetings. Fifth, banks should have a larger board size to empower the capability of detecting
earnings management. Sixth, the board of directors should recommend the appointment of
independent directors. Seventh, a board of directors that suffers from a conflict of interest
between the CEO and the chairperson should have a dual leadership structure.
This research has some limitations. First, this research uses a small sample size of Islamic
banks, which may cause a bias in the results due to the domination of conventional banks.
Second, the research excludes Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen due to their
political issues or the undeveloped banking sector. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized
to all countries in the MENA region. Third, this research includes only a few banks in Morocco
and Tunisia who publish their annual reports in English or Arabic. Thus, the results cannot be
generalized to all banks in Morocco and Tunisia.
This research highlights several avenues for future research. First, samples in future
studies need to be expanded to cover more Islamic banks in the MENA region. Second, future
studies may focus on other countries such as Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen.
Third, future research may examine other corporate governance mechanisms that may impact
earnings management, for example, ownership concentration, CEO experience, CEO profession,
board committees.
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Glossary:
Gender diversity in this research refers to the representation of female directors on the board.

